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Abstract In this paper I present a new database of bilateral migrant stocks and I
provide new evidence on the determinants of internationalmigration. The newCensus-
based data are obtained from National Statistical Offices of 24 OECD countries, and
they cover the total stock of immigrants in each destination country for 1960–2000,
including 188 countries of origin, sometimes in grouped categories. For each census,
I keep grouped categories in a raw manner, without making imputations to specific
origin countries. In the empirical analysis, I give an explicit treatment to these grouped
categories. Results present strong evidence of heterogeneous effects of income gains
on migration prospects depending on distance. For example, a 1000$ increase in
US income per capita increases the stock of Mexican immigrants in the country by
I am indebted to Manuel Arellano for his constant encouragement and advice. I wish to thank Stéphane
Bonhomme, Juan J. Dolado, Manu García-Santana, Jesús Fernández-Huertas, Nezih Guner, Claudio
Michelacci, Pedro Mira, Francesc Ortega, Roberto Ramos, Pedro Rey-Biel, Rob Sauer, Jim Walker, the
editors (Victor Aguirregabiria and Manuel Bagues), two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at
CEMFI for helpful comments and discussions. Financial support from European Research Council
through Starting Grant n. 263600, and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through
Grant ECO2014-59056-JIN, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D
(SEV-2011-0075) is gratefully acknowledged. I am thankful to the help from several statistical offices
from many OECD countries in providing me with the data, and to Hugo Ferradáns and Marta Aguilera,
who provided excellent research assistance.
B Joan Llull
joan.llull@movebarcelona.eu
http://pareto.uab.cat/jllull
1 Departament d’Economia i Història Econòmica, Facultat d’ Economia, Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona, Edifici B, Campus de Bellaterra, Cerdanyola del Vallès, 08193 Barcelona, Spain
2 MOVE, Barcelona, Spain
3 Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain
123
222 SERIEs (2016) 7:221–255
a percentage 2.6 times larger than the percentage increase in the stock of Chinese
(8 vs. 3.1 %).
Keywords International migration · Data collection · Grouped data
JEL Classification F22 · J61 · O15
1 Introduction
International migration has increased dramatically in recent decades. Understanding
the determinants of the movement of workers across international borders is crucial
for immigration policy design. This paper aims to enhance our knowledge about these
determinants by presenting new data on bilateral migrant stocks, a new treatment of
those data in the empirical analysis, and new empirical evidence on the determinants
of international migration.
To create the new database, I collected data on international migrant stocks by
country of origin from National Statistical Offices of the 24 richest OECD countries.
This dataset includes bilateral stocks of immigrants from 188 countries of origin into
these 24 destination countries over the period 1960 to 2000. The data come from
Census records at these destination countries. Given this, it covers the total amount
of immigrants living in the country. Importantly, because the data sometimes appear
in grouped categories, I keep track of these groups in a raw manner, without making
imputations to specific countries of origin.1 This is important because imputations,
dropping grouped observations, and/or counting grouped observations as zeros may
lead to important biases in the estimates.
Empirically, this paper makes two contributions. First, it gives explicit treatment to
these grouped data in standard gravity regressions. Second, it presents evidence on the
existence of heterogeneous effects of income gains on migration prospects depending
on distance. According to a static model—the approach which mostly followed by the
literature—when individuals decide whether to migrate to another country, they base
their decision on net income gains from migration, i.e. the differential in expected
wages between the two countries net of (one time) moving costs.2 From a dynamic
point of view, however, individuals may care about moving costs (distance in partic-
ular) even after having migrated. Large moving costs may reduce their flexibility to
move back and forth to their home country as a consequence of income shocks;3 and, if
individuals dislike living far away from home, they may require a compensating wage
1 These grouped categories are either residual categories or other types of groups of countries, like continents
or subcontinents of origin, or former countries that later were dissolved into smaller countries, like USSR,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rhodesia, and so on.
2 Examples of papers using this approach include Borjas (1987), Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), Karemera
et al. (2000), Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Clark et al. (2007), Pedersen et al. (2008), Mayda (2010), and
Grogger and Hanson (2011) amongmany others. Recent papers like Bertoli and Fernández-HuertasMoraga
(2013), Bertoli et al. (2013), or Ortega and Peri (2013) estimate nested logit models that allow for different
elasticities across destinations.
3 Kennan and Walker (2011) and Lessem (2013) argue that migration is a dynamic decision, and that
repeated and return migration are important in the data.
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differential for living abroad that might be increasing in distance. Forward looking
individuals will take these two factors into account when deciding whether to migrate
in the first place. As a result, the effect of income gains onmoving prospects (net of the
initial moving cost) may be heterogeneous depending on distance: individuals from
countries away from home would be less reactive to income fluctuations compared to
individuals from closer countries. Results suggest that these heterogeneities are indeed
very important. For example, a 1000$ increase in US income per capita increases the
stock ofMexican immigrants in the US by a percentage that is 2.6 times larger than the
percentage increase in the stock of Chinese immigrants. In other words, the effect of
income on log migrant stocks is 2.6 times larger for Mexico compared to China (8 vs.
3.1 %), given that Beijing is around 2.6 times as far from Washington DC as Mexico
City is. This differs from the standard gravity equation, which would predict linear
effects of income gains on logmigrant stocks (Beine et al. 2015). This result is relevant
for immigration policy design. For example, a pull-driven immigration shock (i.e. pos-
itive income shock) may imply significant changes in the composition of immigrant
population in terms of nationalities. Similarly, a negative shock to a developing coun-
try may have a much larger effect for neighboring countries than previous estimates in
the literature suggest; this larger effect suggests that destination countries may want to
favor neighboring countries in development assistance policies if they are interested
in reducing immigrant inflows.
Collecting data on bilateral migration is, in general, a difficult task. Reliability
of statistics from origin countries is low because it is difficult to keep track of the
people who leave the country. Data from destination countries is more accurate. The
lack of comparable cross-destination country bilateral data led many papers in the
literature to follow a single destination country over time (e.g. Borjas and Bratsberg
1996; Karemera et al. 2000; Clark et al. 2007; Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga
2013). More recently, researchers and institutions have put some effort in gathering
comparable bilateralmigration data across destination countries. Pedersen et al. (2008)
and Mayda (2010) are the first papers using cross-destination country panel data on
bilateral inflows to analyze the effect of incomegains andmoving costs on international
migration. Mayda (2010) uses a database from OECD on annual legal inflows of
workers by country of origin; she uses these data to investigate the determinants of
migration inflows into 14 OECD countries between 1980 and 1995. Pedersen et al.
(2008) produce a similar database collecting data on issues of residence and work
permits from National Statistical Offices from 1989 to 2000. They use these data
to look at the effects of networks and welfare benefits on international migration.
These two databases have recently been expanded by Ortega and Peri (2013) and
Adserà and Pytliková (2012) respectively.4 The four databases contain information on
inflows of immigrants and, with a lower accuracy, net flows. They are based on the
number of issues of residence and work permits, which is likely to produce a severe
underestimation the real numbers due to illegal migration. And, acknowledged by the
authors, they have an important amount of missing data and incorrect zero values (for
4 The database inOrtega and Peri (2013) includes information for 15 destination countries and 120 countries
of origin for the period 1980–2006. Adserà and Pytliková (2012) cover the period 1980 to 2009 for 30
destination countries and many countries of origin (with missing data).
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countries with relatively small flows), covering, as a result, a limited fraction of total
inflows (Mayda 2010, pp. 1258–1259).
Similarly to what I do in this paper, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and Docquier
et al. (2009) collect Census-based data. The aim of their databases is to gather infor-
mation on stocks of immigrants by educational level, and, for this reason, they only
cover two census dates, 1990 and 2000. Two papers use these data to analyze the
determinants of international migration. Grogger and Hanson (2011) use them to the
analyze the determinants of scale and composition of migration flows. Ortega and Peri
(2014b) combine these two years of data on stocks with the OECD database on annual
legal inflows used in Mayda (2010) to extrapolate stocks back to 1980 and analyze the
determinants of migration flows.
Contemporaneously to this paper, a few additional datasets appeared. Özden et al.
(2011) is themost similar. These authors collect bilateral stock data for the same period
and from similar sources. The key difference with the current dataset is the treatment
of data when bilateral information is not available. When this happens, which is often
the result of grouping of data (residual categories, aggregations of countries,…), these
authors try to recover the bilateral information by means of an array of different
imputations. Conversely, I keep these grouping in a raw manner, giving it a specific
treatment in the empirical analysis. Given the similarity, I draw some comparisonswith
this dataset below. The other three datasets are: United Nations (2013), which provides
similar information for years 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2013; Brücker et al. (2013), who
add the educational and gender dimension for the period 1980 to 2010; and, Abel and
Sander (2014), who estimate inflows and outflows out of the stock data for 1990–2010.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the database.
Section 3 introduces the econometric model and explains the implications of grouped
data in terms of identification of fixed effects. Section 4 shows estimation results. And
Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 A new database on bilateral migrant stocks (1960–2000)
In this paper, I collect data from National Statistical Offices of 24 OECD countries.5
The dataset contains stocks of immigrants by country of origin from1960 to 2000.Data
are based on destination countries’ Censuses.6 From each Census, I collect data on
the stock of immigrants by country of birth or country of nationality. The dataset con-
tains information on stocks of immigrants from 188 countries of origin—sometimes
in grouped categories—into each of the destination countries.7 Although some desti-
5 These include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (Rep.), Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
6 Nordic countries replaced Censuses for continuous population registers during 1980s.
7 Source countries include all Member States of United Nations except Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco,
Myanmar, Marshall Islands, Nauru, San Marino, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu (none of them are available in
Penn World Tables). Additionally, it includes the dependent territories of Taiwan, Macao, Hong Kong,
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nation countries carry a census every five years, most of them do it every 10 years, so
data is presented at a 10-year frequency. Hence, the database is well suited for looking
at long-run effects.
There are some comparability issues that are worth mentioning. First, similar to
existing datasets in the literature, the definition of immigrant is different across coun-
tries. Some countries define immigrants on the basis of the place of birth whereas
others do it based on nationality. This might affect the comparability of stocks across
destination countries, but changes over time are reasonably comparable.8 Second,
census dates vary across destination countries—roughly a half of them are carried in
even years (1960, 1970,…) and the other half in odd years (1961, 1971,…).9 Dates
are generally consistent for each country, so the difference between two census dates
is usually of ten years.
Data may be grouped for several reasons. One of them is that Statistical Offices
decide to group several countries into one or some residual categories (usually labeled
as “Other countries in region X”). In some other cases, they report the stock of immi-
grants born in a former country that later was split into smaller countries: USSR,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Rhodesia, and the West Indies Federa-
tion are good examples. Finally, in some cases all origin countries are grouped, either
because I only observe the total stock of immigrants in the destination country (a
single group), or because the data is presented in big aggregate categories (e.g. data
by continent or subcontinent of origin).
Table 1 summarizes the importance of grouped data. There are several aspects to
highlight from the Table. First, data are more disaggregated in recent years: the aver-
age number of countries in grouped categories decrease from 167 to 87, and the share
of the total stock that they represent decreases from more than one third in 1960 to
less than 10 % in year 2000. Second, even though in 1960 and 1970 the coverage
of total migrant stocks by bilateral data is only of around two thirds of the stock,
this coverage increases to 80 % if we exclude the destination countries for which we
only observe the total migrant stock. And third, even considering only disaggregated
bilateral observations, the coverage of the total stock of immigrants is pretty large.
For example, it is larger than in the OECD database used in Mayda (2010). Indeed,
Footnote 7 continued
Bermuda, The Netherlands Antilles, and Puerto Rico. Montenegro and Serbia are considered as a sole
country.
8 Destination country fixed effects, and especially destination-time fixed effects, are likely to account for
most if not all these differences, given the log-specification of stocks in the specification estimated below.
A caveat would still remain if policies introduced by a destination country affect different origin countries
differently at different points in time.
9 The only exception is France, whose Censuses were carried in 1954, 1962, 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999
and 2006. I interpolate them linearly to fit census dates to 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001. Some years
for three additional countries have to be extrapolated as well. Disaggregated information for Denmark and
Finland circa 1960 and 1970 was not available, so I exploit information on residence permits for Denmark
and on main language used for Finland. For Germany, pre-unification censuses are not available, so data on
legal flows intoWest Germany is used to extrapolate. Robustness analysis to the exclusion of 1960 and 1970
is presented in the Appendix. Finally, data for United Kingdom includes only immigrants living in England
and Wales; for year 2000 they represent a 95 % of the total stock of immigrants in the UK, a percentage
that was uniformly distributed across origin countries.
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Mayda (2010) states that the coverage of total inflows in her database ranges from
45 % (Belgium) to 84 % (US). For the equivalent time period, the average cover-
age by bilateral observations here ranges from 80 to 91 %. Regarding the number
of countries with disaggregate bilateral observations, Mayda (2010) and Ortega and
Peri (2013) use a sample of 79 and 120 origin countries respectively—including zero
flows that “are likely to correspond to very small flows rather than zero flows” (Mayda
2010);Pedersen et al. (2008), report a substantial portion of missing values among
their sample of 129 countries of origin. The country coverage for these years is sim-
ilar on average in Table 1, but it is much larger both if we restrict to the sample of
15 destination countries considered in Mayda (2010) and Ortega and Peri (2013),
or if we consider federations of countries that were single countries at the time as
ungrouped countries (e.g., Former Yugoslavia accounted for almost a half of the stock
of immigrants in Austria in years between 1970 and 1990, one quarter of the stock in
Switzerland in year 2000, and around a 10 % of the Swedish stock in years between
1980 and 2000, and the USSR represented between 5 and 8 % of US and Canadian
stocks in years 1960 and 1970, and around a 3 % in other several destination coun-
tries).
2.2 Description of the data
Table 2 presents averages, standard deviations, and extreme values for each desti-
nation country, and the number of available observations. The left panel refers to
the baseline sample, which includes all disaggregated bilateral observations plus one
observation for each set of grouped countries. To compute these statistics, grouped
observations are weighted by the number of countries included in the group. The right
panel restricts the sample to disaggregated bilateral observations. The baseline sample
includes 6,804 bilateral observations plus 625 grouped observations. These observa-
tions are not uniformly distributed across destination countries, ranging from the 55
single bilateral observations for Luxembourg (plus 26 grouped observations) to the
744 for Switzerland (plus 28 groups).
The comparison of averages across the two samples suggests that grouped observa-
tions tend to include countries with smaller stocks of migrants, which is not surprising
given that some grouping occurs due to labeling like “Other countries in region X”.
The difference in average stock size between the two samples, however, may be exag-
gerated by the fact that data are more grouped in earlier years of the sample, when
immigrant stocks are smaller. The fact that grouping does not occur at random high-
lights the importance of including grouped observations in the analysis (as opposed
to dropping them from the sample).
Table 2 shows substantial variation in average migrant stocks, ranging from 46
immigrants per origin country in Iceland to 99,276 individuals per country in the
United States. There is also a large variation across origin countries, as appreciated
from the size of standard deviations. The extreme case is the US, with a standard
deviation of 395,483 individuals, and stocks of immigrants that range from the 11
immigrants from Djibouti in 1990 to the 9,325,452 Mexicans in year 2000, but it is
not the only one: Canada, Germany, France, and Japan also have sizeable standard
123
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for migrant stocks
Full sample Ungrouped observations only
Obs. Mean Sd. Min Max Obs. Mean Sd. Min Max
Australia 531 15,982 78,882 1 1,104,594 486 28,975 107,671 1 1,104,594
Austria 280 1924 9938 1 132,975 253 4859 17,424 1 132,975
Belgium 261 3965 21,011 0 279,700 223 16,201 40,676 17 279,700
Canada 405 21,362 75,118 1 969,715 370 44,759 115,159 1 969,715
Denmark 555 935 3322 0 50,470 526 1444 4261 1 50,470
Finland 367 152 527 1 7887 354 218 690 1 7887
France 126 16,787 77,617 107 791,627 91 152,310 203,663 5728 791,627
Germany 108 29,159 78,535 288 1,947,938 95 95,841 227,470 366 1,947,938
Greece 301 1315 14,653 1 438,036 275 4279 26,790 8 438,036
Iceland 174 46 182 0 2456 147 204 424 1 2456
Ireland 82 1163 12,441 20 242,155 73 13,694 42,575 20 242,155
Italy 225 2214 9956 3 180,103 194 9353 20,320 15 180,103
Japan 109 4110 40,867 26 567,598 99 37,854 120,424 102 567,598
Korea (Rep.) 106 284 2272 0 47,474 89 2775 6882 1 47,474
Luxembourg 81 500 3198 0 58,657 55 7737 10,857 115 58,657
The Netherlands 208 2167 11,284 1 191,500 193 8146 23,896 1 191,500
New Zealand 138 2601 15,140 31 232,764 106 12,021 32,276 39 232,764
Norway 162 801 2691 8 33,251 126 4944 5801 26 33,251
Portugal 401 482 2619 1 37,014 377 1111 4038 1 37,014
Spain 487 2811 13,692 0 244,630 467 5157 19,080 1 244,630
Sweden 592 1993 10,369 0 181,477 570 2936 13,110 1 181,477
Switzerland 772 5411 33,453 0 583,855 744 6008 37,014 1 583,855
United Kingdom 361 17,338 56,261 3 675,870 327 39,377 90,436 3 675,870
United States 597 99,276 395,483 11 9,325,452 564 154,516 501,317 11 9,325,452
All 7429 9699 90,725 0 9,325,452 6804 26,483 162,994 1 9,325,452
The unit of observation is origin-destination-year. All figures (except the number of observations) are in
individual counts. Left panel refers to the baseline sample,which includes disaggregate bilateral observations
and grouped observations—grouped observations are weighted by the number of countries included in the
group. Right panel restricts the sample to disaggregated bilateral observations
deviations, and they are also quite large in Greece and Ireland compared to averages.
Overall, the standard deviation in the whole sample is 90,729 individuals, roughly ten
times the sample average.10
Table 2 does not provide a sense of time series variation. Figure 1 draws the evolu-
tion of immigrant shares (i.e. stock of immigrants over population) across destination
countries over the sample period. Different patterns are observed across countries:
10 These sample standard deviations are downward biased unless the stock of immigrants from all countries
in each grouped observation is the same; the underestimation of the true standard deviations will be larger
the larger the (unobserved) dispersion within each grouped observation.
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Fig. 1 Share of immigrants (%) for sample OECD countries (1960–2000). Each plot presents destination
country’s share of immigrants (immigrants over population). Left axes have a common scale, ranging from
0 to 25 %—which is compressed for Luxembourg due to its exceptionally large fraction of immigrants
(36.4 % in year 2000)
stable low-immigration countries (Korea and Japan), stable high-immigration coun-
tries (Australia, Canada and New Zealand), old immigration countries with a strong
increasing trend (US, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the UK), old immigration coun-
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Fig. 2 Stocks (1000s) and share of population who migrated (0/00) for selected country pairs (1960–2000).
a Some country pairs with low migrant rates. b Some country pairs with high migrant rates. Solid lines are
bilateral migrant stocks (in 1000s, left axis) from the origin to the destination countries listed in each title.
Dashed lines are migrant rates (in 0/00, right axis), i.e. stock of migrants from country “X” in country “Y”
over total population of country “X” (origin). Left axis scale is common to all country pairs ranging from 0
to 1000—which is compressed for MEX and PHI to USA (9.3 and 4.4 million respectively in year 2000).
Right axes from top panel have also common scale (0 to 1 0/00); in the bottom panel, it ranges from 0 to
5 0/00 in the first rows, from 0 to 20 0/00 in the second one, and from 0 to 120 0/00 and 0 to 240 0/00 in the
last row
tries with a slight decrease (Belgium and France), and new immigration countries
(Spain, Italy, Austria, Greece, Portugal, and Nordic Countries). Figure 2 adds the
country of origin layer. In particular, I plot the evolution of the stock of immi-
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grants and of the bilateral migration rate for a selected group of country pairs.11
The figure shows substantial variation across countries and over time. The top panel
includes a sample of country pairs with low migration rates, which include some
pairs with flat trend (e.g. North American in Ireland or Japan, Chinese in Korea),
and others with important increases over the sample period (Somali in Italy, Pol-
ish in Austria, Swedish in Finland). The bottom panel includes country pairs with
high migrant rates, including pairs with decreasing rates (Korean in Japan, Irish
in the UK, Spanish in France), roughly constant rates (Australian and British/Irish
in New Zealand, British in Australia), and sharply increasing rates (Ecuadorian
in Spain, Albanian in Greece, and, most extremely, Filipino and Mexican in the
US).
2.3 Comparison with Özden, Parsons, Schiff and Walmsey (2011)
Contemporaneous work by Özden et al. (2011) provides a similar dataset. These
authors’ approach is to impute grouped observations to specific origin countries. They
do so based on the propensity of destination countries to accept migrants from a
particular origin in subsequent years, and based on the propensity of a given origin
country to send them abroad. These imputations may be particularly harming when
one is interested in estimating, precisely, the determinants of international migration.
This methodmay generate measurement error correlated, almost by construction, with
the regressors of interest.
Table 3 reproduces Table 2 using Özden et al. (2011) dataset (generating artifi-
cially grouped observations). The comparison between the two tables is interesting.
On average, their data predicts, about 2,000 extra immigrants per origin coun-
try, almost 4,000 when only origin countries with bilateral observations (in the
current dataset) are considered. This gap is not homogeneous across destination
countries. Some countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and United King-
dom) present very similar stocks. Others (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United States) present substantially
different averages both in grouped and in bilateral observations. Finally, another
(Korea) is similar in the bilateral observations and differ substantially in grouped
observations. Data in Özden et al. (2011) also have a larger cross-origin country vari-
ance.
To elaborate further in these differences, Fig. 3 presents histograms of the dis-
tribution of discrepancies for those observations with bilateral information available
in both datasets. The majority of the observations (4,861 out of 6,804, or 71.4 %)
present no discrepancies or discrepancies of less than 1000 migrants (central lines of
Fig. 3c). The remaining 1943 observations (28.6 %) are distributed as follows: 1,338
(19.7 %) have discrepancies between 1000 and 10,000; 534 (7.8 %) have discrep-
ancies of between 10,000 and 100,000 migrants, and 69 (1 %) have discrepancies
above 100,000 migrants. Most of these extreme discrepancies are given by the defi-
11 The rate is defined as country pair’s stock of migrants over origin country’s population.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for migrant stocks in Özden et al. (2011)
Full sample Ungrouped observations only
Obs. Mean Sd. Min Max Obs. Mean Sd. Min Max
Australia 531 15,611 78,667 0 1,092,182 486 28,426 107,436 0 1,092,182
Austria 280 4266 17,038 0 189,405 253 8663 28,913 0 189,405
Belgium 261 4068 21,416 2 288,899 223 16,588 41,441 5 288,899
Canada 405 21,235 76,300 0 941,217 370 44,147 117,262 0 941,217
Denmark 555 986 3234 0 31,883 526 1520 4130 0 31,883
Finland 367 320 1442 0 28,981 354 440 2255 0 28,981
France 126 27,784 118,934 228 1,493,990 91 225,080 318,615 1286 1,493,990
Germany 108 42,042 122,814 244 2,008,979 95 148,971 359,689 337 2,008,979
Greece 301 1558 14,356 0 420,838 275 4968 26,155 0 420,838
Iceland 174 41 173 0 2306 147 189 403 0 2306
Ireland 82 1111 11,926 4 227,440 73 13,105 40,820 19 227,440
Italy 225 6395 19,085 6 286,498 194 23,276 37,085 29 286,498
Japan 109 5309 50,733 21 700,574 99 48,993 148,913 126 700,574
Korea (Rep.) 106 2122 4193 0 48,165 89 2731 6856 0 48,165
Luxembourg 81 474 2549 1 41,352 55 6852 8168 139 41,352
The Netherlands 208 4250 15,273 0 178,273 193 12,971 32,005 0 178,273
New Zealand 138 2491 15,832 4 272,190 106 11,781 35,143 4 272,190
Norway 162 806 2772 8 34,109 126 5024 6020 26 34,109
Portugal 401 1570 9970 0 167,578 377 3460 15,500 0 167,578
Spain 487 4010 16,702 0 253,173 467 7504 23,105 0 253,173
Sweden 592 3438 16,593 0 250,527 570 4983 20,927 0 250,527
Switzerland 772 6203 36,556 0 590,957 744 6794 40,427 0 590,957
United Kingdom 361 17,750 58,907 0 717,774 327 40,223 95,019 0 717,774
United States 597 103,392 405,297 0 9,367,910 564 161,379 513,337 0 9,367,910
All 7429 11,551 103,308 0 9,367,910 6804 30,163 174,097 0 9,367,910
The unit of observation is origin-destination-year. All figures (except the number of observations) are in
individual counts. Left panel refers to the baseline sample,which includes disaggregate bilateral observations
and grouped observations—grouped observations are weighted by the number of countries included in the
group. Right panel restricts the sample to disaggregated bilateral observations
nition of a migrant, like Algerian, German, Spanish or Italian in France, and Polish,
Russian, and Czech in Germany (some in several periods). Özden et al. (2011) only
moved out of the birthplace definition of immigrant if data by country of birth was not
available for three or more periods. Otherwise, when country of birth is unavailable
for only a few periods, they do imputations based on the information in the available
years. Instead, in line with the spirit of this paper, I use nationality when country
of birth is not consistently available for all periods, so that the data are as raw as
possible.
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Fig. 3 Distribution of discrepancies with Özden et al. (2011) for available bilateral observations. a
>100,000, b ∈ (100,000; 10,000), c <10,000. The histograms present the number of origin coun-
tries/periods with each level of discrepancies. The left histogram omits (absolute) discrepancies smaller
than 100,000 migrants. Center histogram presents observations with absolute deviations between 100,000
and 10,000 migrants. And right panel plots observations with absolute deviations smaller than 10,000
migrants. A positive number indicates that this dataset reports more immigrants than Özden et al. (2011)
2.4 Other variables
The remaining variables used in the regression analysis below come from different
sources (descriptive statistics provided inTable 4).All variables are averages over years
t −10 to t −1. GDP per capita, population, and government share of GDP come from
Penn World Tables (versions 6.2 and 7.0). In order to minimize the number of miss-
ing values for GDP per capita, I use Total Economy Database (Conference Board) to
extrapolate backwards discontinuous PennWorld Tables series. Both origin and desti-
nation countries’ series are in constant international dollars of 2005 (chain). Population
in origin and destination countries are in millions. Government share is public sector
consumption over real GDP.Age dependence ratio at destination country—individuals
older than 65 years over population of working age—is from World Development
Indicators. Unemployment rate (in %) is obtained from the OECD. Geographic vari-
ables include physical distance—great circle distance between the two capitals—and
dummies for having a common language, a past colonial relationship and a common
border. The distance variable is based on Rose (2004) data, extended to cover the
whole sample. The common language dummy is constructed using data from Alesina
et al. (2003) and The World Factbook from the CIA; a pair of countries is consid-
ered to have a common language if there is a particular language that is spoken by
at least a 10 % of the population in each of the two countries. Colonial relationship
and common border dummies are also based on The World Factbook. War and Polity
IV autocracy-democracy index are constructed with data from the Polity IV Project.
The war variable measures the fraction of months over the preceding decade that the
country was in any type of war. The Polity IV index ranges from −10, indicating
autocracy, to 10, which indicates democracy, through values around 0, which indicate
anocracy (a situation of instability emerged from the absence of a strong power and
of the rule of law). The young population variable is constructed using data of total
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables
Full sample Ungrouped observations only
Obs. Mean Sd. Min Max Obs. Mean Sd. Min Max
GDPpc dest. 7429 17.85 8.33 1.59 49.94 6804 21.99 6.87 1.59 49.94
GDPpc origin 7340 8.11 8.06 0.26 215.02 6727 9.68 12.24 0.26 215.02
Log distance 7429 8.31 0.72 4.80 9.79 6804 8.11 0.95 4.80 9.79
Comm. lang. 7429 0.10 0.24 0.00 1.00 6804 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Colonial rel. 7429 0.05 0.17 0.00 1.00 6804 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Common border 7429 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 6804 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Pop. origin 7429 21.68 73.19 0.01 1207.69 6804 40.89 129.93 0.01 1207.69
Pop. dest. 7429 31.27 47.62 0.16 264.74 6804 36.16 60.76 0.22 264.74
Unemp. rate dest. 7172 4.39 2.43 0.03 11.10 6608 5.29 2.34 0.03 11.10
Age dep. dest. 7429 18.45 4.75 2.32 27.66 6804 20.38 3.86 2.32 27.66
Gov. share dest. 7427 9.62 2.81 2.83 19.80 6804 9.31 2.67 2.83 19.80
War origin 7429 0.06 0.13 0.00 1.00 6804 0.08 0.22 0.00 1.00
Polity IV origin 7232 0.60 5.31 −10.00 10.00 6607 2.18 7.32 −10.00 10.00
Pop. 15–34 origin 7231 7.28 26.06 0.01 445.82 6606 14.03 46.81 0.01 445.82
The unit of observation is origin-destination-year. Left panel includes both observations with bilateral
migrant data, and observations for which migrant stocks are grouped —which are grouped equivalently,
weighting by the number of countries in the group. Right panel includes only observations with available
bilateral stocks
population by age group from United Nations. The variable includes the population
aged between 15 and 34.
3 Econometric model
3.1 Standard gravity model
In the reminder of the paper, I use the new data presented above to analyze the determi-
nants of international migration. In particular, the data are used to estimate different
types of “gravity equations” (see Beine et al. 2015 for a review of this literature).
Simplest gravity equations can be derived from random utility models in which the
utility of moving from home country j to country k at time t is of the form:
Ui jkt ≡ wkt − c jk + εi jkt , (1)
where i indicates an individual, wkt is the wage at country k and time t , c jk is the
moving cost from j to k (where c j j is typically normalized to 0), and εi jkt is a random
term that is Type-I extreme value distributed. Given the distributional assumption of
the random term, the relative odds of moving from country j to country k vs. staying
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in country j are equivalent to:
Mjkt
Pop jt
= exp(wkt − w j t ) exp(−c jk), (2)
where Mjkt is the stock of migrants from country j to country k in year t , and Pop jt
is the (ex-post) population in country j at time t .
Taking logs to the above expression, using GDP per capita as a proxy for wages,
and various variables to proxy for moving costs, the model can be written as:
ln Mjkt = α1GDPpckt + α2GDPpc jt + α3 ln dist jk + α4 1{CommLang jk}
+ α5 1{Colony jk} + α6 1{Border jk} + α7 ln Popkt + α8 ln Pop jt
+ Fixed effects + υ jkt . (3)
All the variables included in Eq. (3) are described in Sect. 2.4. Different specifications
include different combinations of fixed effects, depending on the assumptions under-
lying the distribution of εi jkt . These include country of origin, destination country,
year, origin × year, destination × year, and/or country pair fixed effects. Migration
is expected to be positively affected by income gains (hence, α1 is expected to be
positive and α2, negative), by having a common language, a colonial relation, and a
common border, and by the population in the origin country, and negatively affected
by physical distance; the expected sign of the effect of population in the destination
country is ambiguous a priori.
Similar micro-foundation for this regression can be found in the model by Grogger
and Hanson (2011), or in the survey by Beine et al. (2015), and it is comparable
to the previous studies in the literature (Mayda 2010; Grogger and Hanson 2011;
Ortega and Peri 2013). Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) highlight the
importance of origin-time dummies combined with country pair dummies due to the
“Multilateral Resistance toMigration”. Beine et al. (2015) go a step further and suggest
adding origin × time × nest dummies on top. As noted below, with the number of
observations left due to the grouping of the data, these models are too demanding in
terms of degrees of freedom to be credibly estimated.12,13
While the inclusion of GDP per capita in levels to approximate origin and des-
tination country wages in Eq. (3) seems very closely connected to the underlying
theoretical model described by Eqs. (1) and (2) (as noted by Grogger and Hanson
2011), there are many papers in the literature that estimate equations like (3) includ-
ing GDP per capita in logs, as highlighted in Beine et al. (2015). For comparability
with these studies, I run some specifications of Eq. (3) in which GDP per capita is
introduced in logs.
12 Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) propose a formal test to the “Multilateral Resistance to
Migration”. Such test cannot be implemented here because of the grouped data.
13 Several papers in the literature estimated Eq. (3) using the Poisson ML estimator due to the presence of
a substantial number of zero observations. This concern does not apply to this paper, as the current database
includes very few zero migrant stocks (countries with few immigrants are typically in grouped categories).
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3.2 Heterogeneous effects of income gains
An important implication of the model described above is that an increase in GDP per
capita of a destination country would increase the stock of migrants from all origin
countries by the same percentage (i.e. linear effect of GDP per capita on migrant
stocks in logs). Likewise, an increase in the GDP per capita of a given country of
origin would increase the stock of migrants from that country into all destinations by
the same relative amount (linear effect on log migrant stocks).
However, the effect of income shocks on moving prospects might be more marked
for closer countries compared countries that are farther apart. For example, large
moving costs (distance) reduce the flexibility of individuals to move back and forth
to their home country when income changes. As a result, in the migration decision,
individuals from farther away countries may give more weight to long run income (as
opposed to income shocks), whereas individuals from neighboring countries will be
more prone to go back and forth to take advantage of income fluctuations. Similarly,
if individuals dislike living far away from home, they might require a compensating
wage differential to offset the unpleasantness of living abroad. If the disutility of
being far from home increases with distance, they will require an increasing wage
premium to take the decision tomigrate. Hence, these compensatingwage differentials
would also introduce a heterogeneous effect of income gains on moving prospects
depending on distance, which wouldmakemigrationmore reactive to income at closer
distances.
As a way to micro-found these heterogeneous effects, consider the following mod-
ification of Eq. (1):
Ujkt ≡ u(wkt , d jk) − c jk + εi jkt , (4)
where d jk is the distance between home country j and destination k, and u(., .) is
a utility function with an elasticity of substitution between income and distance to
be identified. The case in which wage and proximity (negative distance) are perfect
substitutes is observationally equivalent to the standard utility model.
Following a similar procedure to the one used to derive Eq. (3), and approximating
u(wkt , d jk) by a first order expansion around the mean we obtain:
ln Mi jt = γ1GDPpcit + γ2GDPpc jt + γ3 ˜GDPpckt ˜ln dist jk
+ γ4 ˜GDPpc jt ˜ln dist jk + γ5 ln disti j + γ6 1{CommLangi j }
+ γ7 1{Colonyi j } + γ8 1{Borderi j } + γ9 ln Popit
+ γ10 ln Pop jt + Fixed effects + υi j t , (5)
where x˜ ≡ x−x¯ indicates that variables are in deviationswith respect to samplemeans.
Parameters γ3 and γ4 are reduced forms of the cross-partial derivative of u(wkt , d jk)
evaluated at sample means. Hence, the presence of an heterogeneous response of
migration to shocks to destination and/or origin country’s income as a function of
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distance is an indication of a complementarity (or, potentially, substitution) between
income gains and proximity.
3.3 Identification of fixed effects with grouped data
A potential limitation of working with grouped data is in the identification of fixed
effects in the estimation of Eqs. (3) and (5). In the simplest specifications estimated
below, I introduce origin and destination country fixed effects, and year dummies.
Additionally, in several specifications I introduce country-pair or country of ori-
gin× year dummies.Destination country, time, and destination× time fixed effects are
identified in all cases, as grouping only affects origin countries. To identify a dummy
for an origin country, we need to observe, at least, one bilateral observation from
that country, or that the country appears in a unique combination of grouped obser-
vations.14 To identify a country of origin × year dummy, this bilateral observation or
unique combination of groups has to be observed in each year. And the identification of
a country-pair dummy requires the bilateral observation to be observed at least once
for each destination country. When one of these situations is not satisfied, a single
dummy for each unique combination of groups is identified.
Figure 4 summarizes the availability of this variation in the data. The left his-
togram shows the number of origin countries with 0, 1, . . . , 120 (=24 × 5) country
of destination × year observations. All countries of origin have between 4 and 99
destination × year observations, which is enough to identify all origin country fixed
effects; in most of the cases (105 out of 188 countries, 55 % of them) we have between
20 and 40 observations. The central histogram shows the number of countries of ori-
gin × years with bilateral data for the 0, 1, . . . , 24 destination countries. The figure
shows that we cannot separately identify country of origin × year dummies in 160 out
of 188×5 = 940 origin× year combinations (17%), inmost of the cases, this is due to
federations of countries—USSR, Yugoslavia,…—that were still federated at the given
period. Finally, the right histogram shows the number of country pairs with bilateral
data for the 0, 1, . . . , 5 periods. According to the figure, we cannot identify a country
pair dummy for 1854 out of 24× 188 = 4488 country pairs (41 %).15 This limitation
does not affect consistency of the estimates below, but it affects the precision of the
estimation of themost demandingmodels. Richermodels that include the combination
of country-pair and origin × year dummies, as suggested by Bertoli and Fernández-
Huertas Moraga (2013), or the even richer ones that add origin × year × nest on top,
as in Beine et al. (2015) would absorb too many degrees of freedom to allow us to
draw any relevant conclusion from them.
14 For example, consider that for a destination country A we have two observations that belong to the “Rest
of Europe” group. If in another destination country B one of them belongs to the “Yugoslavia” category
and the other does not, I would be able to identify them separately.
15 Additionally, for 83 countries of origin × years (9 %) and for 637 country pairs (14 %) we only have
one observation. In this case, the available observation together with the grouped data for other destination
countries is enough to identify the fixed effect, but such observations do not contribute to the identification
of other parameters.
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Fig. 4 Available ungrouped bilateral observations. a Origin countries. b Origin countries × periods. c
Country pairs. Left histogram presents the number of origin countries with 0, 1, . . . , 120 destination× year
observations; the total amount of origin countries is 188. Center histogram shows the number of ori-
gin × years with 0, 1, . . . , 24 destination country observations; there are 188 × 5 = 940 origin × year
observations. Right histogram presents the number of country pairs with 0, 1, . . . , 5 yearly observations;
the total amount of country pairs is 24 × 187 = 4488
4 Estimation results
4.1 Linear effects: standard gravity model
Table 5 presents the results for the estimation of different versions of Eq. (3). All
regressions include at least origin and destination country fixed effects, and year dum-
mies. The first column is the baseline specification. The stock of migrants is positively
associated with the GDP per capita of the destination country. This result suggest
that better economic opportunities in the destination country encourage migration.
In particular, everything else constant, a 1000$ increase in GDP per capita of the
destination country increases the immigrant stock by a 5.2 %. This magnitude is
in line, for example, with Ortega and Peri (2013), who find a positive effect of a
5–6 %. According to the results in Table 5, a 10 % increase in GDP per capita of
the average country of destination (which is 17,848$, see Table 4) would increase
the immigrant stock by a 9.3 %.16,17 GDP per capita in OECD countries averaged
9,101$ in 1960, and 27,341$ in year 2000. According to the results in Table 5,
this 200 % increase would have increased the stock of immigrants in a 95 % (25
millions of immigrants over the OECD), more than a half of the actual increase
(45 millions).
16 This result is qualitatively in line with Mayda (2010), who finds that a 10 % increase in destination
country GDP per capita increases emigration rates by a 20 %. Quantitatively, these numbers are hard to
compare as her dependent variable is in flows instead of stocks.
17 As noted by Beine et al. (2015), the inclusion of different combinations of dummies imply that estimates
are consistent with random utility models that are not based on the canonical version of the gravity model.
This affects the interpretation of the results in terms of elasticities.
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Table 5 Determinants of bilateral migrant stocks—linear effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDPpc dest. 0.052
(0.023)
0.069
(0.014)
0.053
(0.023)
0.053
(0.027)
0.043
(0.020)
GDPpc origin −0.008
(0.009)
−0.007
(0.008)
−0.010
(0.009)
−0.014
(0.011)
−0.017
(0.015)
GDPpc gap 0.023
(0.011)
Log distance −0.904
(0.073)
−0.903
(0.074)
−1.051
(0.047)
−0.931
(0.077)
−0.910
(0.057)
−0.832
(0.069)
Common language 0.585
(0.131)
0.582
(0.132)
0.760
(0.081)
0.591
(0.144)
0.581
(0.096)
0.600
(0.121)
Colonial rel. 2.281
(0.146)
2.277
(0.145)
2.107
(0.099)
2.285
(0.156)
2.268
(0.122)
2.382
(0.125)
Common border 0.030
(0.178)
0.033
(0.178)
0.036
(0.125)
−0.004
(0.187)
0.026
(0.151)
0.235
(0.164)
Log pop. origin 1.341
(0.493)
1.075
(0.442)
1.466
(0.197)
1.324
(0.277)
1.227
(0.631)
1.742
(0.465)
Log pop. dest. 1.161
(1.157)
1.012
(1.187)
−1.902
(0.440)
1.082
(1.157)
1.100
(1.387)
−0.215
(0.886)
Grouped obs. Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
St. devs. of controls No No No No No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Origin dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin-time dummies No No No Yes No No No
Destination dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Dest.-time dummies No No No No Yes No No
Country-pair dummies No No No No No Yes No
Obs 7340 7340 6727 7429 7340 7340 7332
R¯2 0.958 0.958 0.966 0.956 0.975 0.960 0.966
Standard errors, clustered at the origin-time level, in parentheses. Dependent variable: log migrant stocks.
Unit of observation: origin-destination-time. Regressions include the indicated fixed effects. The p-value of
a test of the null that coefficients displayed in Column (3) are jointly equal to point estimates in Column (1)
is 0.000, and the corresponding p-value for Column (7) is 0.264
Theoretical predictions from models like the ones in Grogger and Hanson (2011)
or in Mayda (2010) suggest that α1 and α2 should be similar in magnitude and
of opposite sign. However, Table 5 shows a much smaller effect of origin country
GDP per capita. Although it is negative (consistently in all specifications), the coef-
ficient is far from being significantly different from zero, and point estimates are
one order of magnitude smaller than destination country counterparts. This result
is not new; Mayda (2010) also finds a non-significant effect, although her point
estimates are indeed positive. This finding could result from an additional positive
effect of origin country GDP per capita on migration prospects. Borrowing con-
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straints could be a plausible explanation: if individuals from poorer countries (lower
GDP per capita) are financially constrained, then, other things equal, their chances
to migrate are lower; therefore, the larger the GDP per capita, the less constrained
they are, and the larger is the probability that they migrate. If that were the case, one
would expect that this effect should be homogeneous across all destination countries,
which is in line with findings discussed in Sect. 4.2. Several papers in the litera-
ture explore this possibility, and conclude that this is likely the case (Beine et al.
2015).
Physical and cultural distance play an important role in explaining moving costs.
The elasticity of the migrant stock with respect to physical distance is about 0.9.
Having a common language or a colonial relationship increases importantly the stock
of immigrants. A common border, however, seems less important. These results are,
again, qualitatively similar to Mayda (2010), Grogger and Hanson (2011), and Ortega
and Peri (2013). Finally, we can neither reject that the coefficient of log popula-
tion in the origin country is equal to one, nor that the one of log population in the
destination country is zero, which are the values predicted by the model outlined
above.
The remaining columns of Table 5 check the stability of the estimates across dif-
ferent versions of the same equation. In order to obtain estimates which are fully
comparable to Grogger and Hanson (2011), in Column (2) I impose the same coef-
ficient (of opposite sign) for origin and destination countries’ GDP per capita. The
coefficient of income gap is 0.023 (s.e. 0.011) very close to their estimate of 0.018 (s.e.
0.029) and much more precisely estimated, given the larger coverage by the dataset
presented in this paper. Additionally, the coefficients for the variables associated with
moving costs are extremely similar.
The fact that these estimates are comparable to Grogger and Hanson (2011) is
useful to asses the validity of the way in which grouped data is treated in this paper.
Grogger and Hanson (2011) use data from Docquier and Marfouk (2006), which is
census data collected in a similar manner to the one in this paper for years 1990
and 2000. Grogger and Hanson (2011) estimate their regressions using data for year
2000. The similarity in the coefficients with respect to their paper indicates that the
treatment I give to the grouped data produces consistent estimates of the relevant
coefficients.
In order to analyze the importance of including the 100 % of migrant stocks,
I drop grouped observations in Column (3). Although qualitative results hold,
point estimates are somewhat different. In particular, four out of the eight coeffi-
cients are statistically different from point estimates in Column (1), and a Wald
test of the null hypothesis that all eight coefficients are equal to their counter-
parts in Column (1) clearly rejects it (see p-value in the note of Table 5). This
differences are caused by the fact that grouped observations (which are elimi-
nated in previous studies) are not from a random sample of countries of origin.
Therefore, we can conclude that including grouped observations—so that we cover
the 100 % of total migrant stocks—is very important to obtain unbiased esti-
mates.
In Columns (4) through (6), I change the specification of fixed effects. On top of
origin, destination, and time fixed effects that are included in Columns (1) though (3),
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I enrich the analysis by adding destination × time, origin × time, and country-pair
dummies respectively. These specifications aremore demanding in terms of degrees of
freedom (see discussion on Fig. 4). Estimates are very stable across specifications. This
stability of the coefficients is very interesting, as each specification controls somewhat
for different versions of migration policies that may affect the results. Ortega and Peri
(2013) show that a specification like the one in Column (4)—which includes country
of origin × year dummies—emerges from a version of the random utility model in
Grogger and Hanson (2011) extended to allow for individual-specific time-invariant
random effects in the specification of the idiosyncratic utility function.
A problem of having some observations aggregated in grouped categories is that,
since we only observe the stock of immigrants for the group, the dependent variable is
measured with error provided that the log of the average stock of the group is not equal
to the average of logs of bilateral stocks. The problem with this measurement error is
that it is obviously correlated with the covariates. In order to check to what extent this
could be a relevant issue, in Column (7) I include as controls standard deviations of the
regressors within the grouped observations (zero for bilateral observations). Given that
themeasurement error increases as the countries in the groupedobservationdiffer in the
stock of immigrants, these standard deviations are good proxies for the measurement
error.18 Results are again robust; none of the coefficients of the regressors of interest
is statistically different from its counterpart in Column (1), and the test of the joint
difference cannot reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients are (jointly) equal to
point estimates in Column (1)—the p-value of the test is reported in the note of Table 5.
As noted in Sect. 3.1, several studies in the literature estimate equations similar
to (3) including GDP per capita in logs. For comparability with these studies, I run
the same specifications of Table 5 using log GDP per capita instead of the levels.
Results are presented in Table 8 in Appendix 1. Point estimates are in line with results
in Table 5 and those in the literature. Estimated elasticities of GDP per capita in
destination countries are around 0.6, slightly smaller but not very different from the
average elasticity implied by the coefficients in Table 5. Those for GDP per capita
at origin are rather small. The coefficients of other variables are virtually unchanged.
However, the precision of estimated elasticities for GDP per capita at origin and
destination is substantially lower.
To keep with the comparison between the database presented here and that by
Özden et al. (2011), Table 9 in Appendix 1 replicates the regressions presented in
Table 5 using the dataset produced by these authors. Sample sizes are obviously larger,
given that observations for grouped countries are imputed to specific countries. While
qualitatively similar, point estimates are somewhat different to those in Table 5. The
estimated coefficient for GDP per capita at destination, for example, is 0.015 (s.e.
0.005) instead of 0.052 (s.e. 0.023) in Table 5. The elasticity of distance is around -1.1
instead of 0.9. And so on. These differences are more likely attributable to differences
in the data collected than to the grouping itself. Themotivation for this belief is that the
coefficients of Column (3) in each table, which are only estimated for the subsample
of observations with bilateral information in both datasets, are also quite different.
18 Given that the logarithm is a concave function, by the Jensen inequality the logarithm of the average of
the group is larger than the average of the logarithm, unless all elements are equal.
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As a final robustness check, I also estimate the regressions in Table 5 excluding
observations for 1960, and 1960 plus 1970 (results are available upon request from
the author). We have seen in Sect. 2 that data is particularly grouped in these years
(especially the first), and that data reliability is slightly lower in those years (see
Footnote 9). Results are again robust.
4.2 Heterogeneous effects of income gains depending on distance
Estimates for Eq. (5) are presented in Table 6. As the interacted terms in Eq. (5) are
expressed in differences from sample means, the linear terms can be interpreted as
effects for the average country pair (and they are comparable to estimates in Sect. 4.1).
Again, all regressions include at least origin and destination country fixed effects, and
year dummies.
Column (1) in Table 6 is the baseline specification. The effect of destination country
GDP per capita for the average country is exactly the same as in Table 5. The effect
of GDP per capita at origin country is slightly more negative (−0.014 vs. −0.008),
but still not statistically different from zero. The coefficients of all other regressors
that are included in Table 5 are virtually unchanged (except for the point estimate of
common border, that now becomes large and significant).
As the coefficient of the interaction of destination country GDP per capita and dis-
tance suggests, the effect of income gains on moving prospects is not homogeneous
across all origin countries. These coefficients are interpreted as follows: the effect
of a 1000$ increase in GDP per capita of the destination country is 0.21 percentage
points smaller if the distance from the origin country is a 10 percent larger than the
average. To give a sense to these numbers, note that the distance between Washington
DC (US) and Dublin (Ireland) is 5,448 km, roughly the average distance in the sam-
ple. On the other hand, the distance between Washington DC and Beijing (China) is
11,159 km, roughly twice as large. Therefore, a 1000$ increase in GDP per capita in
the US would increase the stock of Irish living in the US by around a 5.2 %, whereas
the stock of Chinese-born would only be increased by approximately 3.1 %. As an
extreme example, a 1000$ increase in GDP per capita in the US would increase the
stock of Mexicans by a 8 %, but the stock of Taiwanese would be increased by only
a 2.8 %.
This is the main empirical result of this paper. Previous literature assumes that an
income shock in a destination country increases the stock of immigrants from all origin
countries by the same percentage. If that were the case, then income shocks would not
affect the composition of the immigrant population. But the finding described above
indicates that income shocks in a destination country have indeed very important
compositional effects. This result is very important for shaping immigration policy.
For example, if the policy maker is willing to preserve the ethnic mix (e.g. it was one
of the goals of the US immigration policy from 1920s to mid-1960s), countermeasures
will be required to compensate market forces. Additionally, if the skill composition
of immigrants from a particular country of origin was not affected by changes in the
size of the flow, income shocks would affect the skill composition of the immigrant
workforce by changing the weight of each origin country in the total stock.
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Table 6 Heterogeneous effects of income gains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPpc dest. 0.052
(0.022)
0.046
(0.022)
0.062
(0.014)
0.044
(0.022)
0.050
(0.024)
GDPpc dest. × log distance −0.021
(0.005)
−0.023
(0.006)
−0.012
(0.004)
−0.019
(0.007)
−0.018
(0.005)
−0.030
(0.011)
GDPpc dest. × common lang. −0.005
(0.022)
−0.022
(0.009)
−0.020
(0.026)
−0.005
(0.015)
0.033
(0.038)
GDPpc dest. × colonial rel. −0.065
(0.025)
−0.019
(0.012)
−0.070
(0.028)
−0.028
(0.016)
−0.082
(0.039)
GDPpc dest. × common border −0.011
(0.023)
−0.004
(0.017)
−0.001
(0.024)
0.005
(0.020)
−0.049
(0.046)
GDPpc origin −0.014
(0.009)
−0.013
(0.009)
−0.014
(0.006)
−0.015
(0.008)
−0.020
(0.011)
GDPpc origin × log distance 0.032
(0.005)
0.029
(0.005)
0.029
(0.004)
0.031
(0.007)
0.029
(0.004)
0.022
(0.011)
GDPpc origin × common lang. −0.007
(0.012)
−0.002
(0.009)
−0.001
(0.012)
−0.006
(0.009)
−0.041
(0.030)
GDPpc origin × colonial rel. −0.020
(0.010)
−0.041
(0.008)
−0.030
(0.014)
−0.022
(0.009)
0.004
(0.031)
GDPpc origin × common border −0.013
(0.020)
−0.009
(0.015)
−0.010
(0.021)
−0.009
(0.018)
−0.008
(0.050)
Log distance −0.936
(0.080)
−0.929
(0.082)
−1.173
(0.052)
−0.989
(0.095)
−0.944
(0.057)
Common language 0.606
(0.128)
0.580
(0.164)
0.850
(0.095)
0.612
(0.209)
0.587
(0.135)
Colonial rel. 2.220
(0.142)
2.279
(0.164)
2.118
(0.104)
2.387
(0.196)
2.242
(0.137)
Common border 0.373
(0.163)
0.542
(0.256)
0.387
(0.195)
0.423
(0.276)
0.457
(0.221)
Log pop. origin 1.382
(0.474)
1.449
(0.472)
1.214
(0.201)
1.348
(0.258)
1.498
(0.648)
Log pop. dest. 1.404
(1.109)
1.367
(1.124)
−1.968
(0.463)
1.273
(1.215)
1.372
(1.426)
Grouped obs. Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Origin dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Origin-time dummies No No No Yes No No
Destination dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Dest.-time dummies No No No No Yes No
Country-pair dummies No No No No No Yes
Obs 7340 7340 6727 7340 7340 7340
R¯2 0.959 0.959 0.967 0.959 0.976 0.961
Standard errors, clustered at the origin-time level, in parentheses. Dependent variable: log migrant stocks.
Unit of observation: origin-destination-time. Regressions include the indicated fixed effects. The p-value of
a test of the null that coefficients displayed in Column (3) are jointly equal to point estimates in Column (2)
is 0.000, and the p-value for a test of the null hypothesis that the interaction coefficients in Column (1) are
equal in magnitude and opposite sign is 0.135
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A similar story can be told for origin countries’ GDP per capita. Despite linear
effects are small and statistically insignificant, the interaction with distance is very
important. Interestingly, the coefficient of this interaction is very similar—with the
opposite sign—to the one for interaction of GDP per capita of the destination coun-
try and distance (indeed, we cannot reject statistically that their magnitudes are the
same—p-value is reported in the table notes). This result, together with the small
estimated coefficient for the linear term, are again suggestive of the presence of an
additional effect of origin country GDP per capita on migration prospects. Follow-
ing with the argument of borrowing constraints, imperfect access to credit markets
in poorer countries would prevent migrants from these countries to afford the migra-
tion cost, although they would have gained from moving if they could have borrowed
resources to afford it; if that were the case, credit market imperfections would increase
the coefficient of the linear term (making it less negative), butwould not affect the inter-
action term. Similarly, another positive direct effect of origin country GDP per capita
could arise through immigration policies, if destination countries are more willing to
accept immigrants from richer countries (which again would not affect the interaction
term).19
The remaining columns of Table 6 check the stability of the estimates across dif-
ferent versions of the same equation. In Column (2) I extend Eq. (5) by including
interactions of origin and destination country GDP per capita with all other measures
of distance. Results are virtually unchanged. Only interactions with colonial rela-
tionship are significant. Surprisingly, both of them have a negative sign. This result,
however, may be driven by policy issues as one would expect that (after controlling
for having a common language) a past colonial relationship only affects migration
through a special treatment by destination countries in terms of immigration policy.
For example, a negative income shock would reduce the stock of immigrants from
non-former colonies in a larger magnitude than from former colonies, which would
receive a special treatment.
In Column (3), I check the importance of including the 100 % of migrant stocks
by dropping grouped observations. As in Table 5, qualitative results hold, but point
estimates are different. In particular, seven coefficients are statistically different from
their counterparts in Column (2), and aWald test of the hypothesis that all coefficients
are equal to their counterparts in Column (2) clearly rejects (p-value in the table
notes).
As in Table 5, in columns (4) to (6) I change the specification of fixed effects.
Again, on top of origin, destination, and time fixed effects (as in columns (1) to (3)), I
introduce destination × time, origin × time, and country pair dummies respectively.
Once again, results are virtually unchanged.
Table 10 in Appendix 2 reproduces the regressions in Table 6 introducing GDP per
capita in logs instead of levels. Again, linear coefficients and the coefficients of the cost
proxies are virtually unchanged with respect to their counterparts in Table 8 (except,
as in Table 6 vs. Table 5, for the coefficient of common border, and, in this case,
19 One could argue that immigration policy is softer in destination countries in “good periods”. This would
tend to produce a larger linear effect of destination country GDP per capita, but it would not affect the
interaction term.
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also Column (6)). And again, interaction terms explain a similar story as in Table 6,
similar relative magnitude compared to the linear term, and similar in size for origin
and destination, with opposite sign. The interaction with colonial relationship is also
significant and in the same relative size and magnitude compared to the linear term,
and it is also of the same sign when interacted with GDP per capita at origin and at
destination. And interactions with the other variables are not statistically significant.
I also estimate again the same regressions using the data from Özden et al. (2011).
Results are presented in Table 11 in Appendix 2. As it occurred in the previous section,
results are somewhat different than in Table 6. The key difference is for the destination
country GDP per capita, which not only is small and insignificant in the linear term,
but now also in the interaction term. Instead, results for GDP per capita at origin are
qualitatively in line with those in Table 6, but with very different magnitudes. And, as
it happened with Table 9, results are still very different even in the case where only
observations with bilateral information in both datasets are included.
As final robustness, I estimate the same regressions excluding 1960, and excluding
1960 and 1970 (results are available upon request from the author). Results are robust.
4.3 Additional results for other push and pull factors
In Table 7, I extend Eq. (5) to control for other push and pull determinants of migration
inmore detail. Specifically, I add unemployment rate, age dependency ratio (older than
65 over working-age population), and government consumption share of GDP (pull
factors), and wars, political regimes, and young population at origin (push factors).
Finally, I also add too specifications that are very demanding because of the grouping
of the data: I control for networks (stock of immigrants from a given origin in a given
destination in the preceding census), and I estimate a regression in flows, computed
as difference in stocks. Overall, the main results from previous sections are generally
stable across specifications.
Aside from income gains, individuals value their probability of finding a job in the
destination country. For this reason, higher unemployment at the country of destination
reducesmigration. Column (1) shows this empirically by including unemployment rate
in the regression. Its effect is estimated to be negative, as expected, and very significant.
Column (2) includes age dependence ratio as a regressor. Countries with older popu-
lations are more willing to admit immigrants to increase social security revenues and
sustain increasingly unbalanced pay-as-you-go systems. Additionally, an older popu-
lation brings in additional work opportunities for immigrants, both in terms of elderly
caring services and because of a lower competition in the labor market. The coefficient
of this variable has the expected positive sign, although its effect is small and statisti-
cally not different from zero. In Column (3) I include the government consumption as
a share of GDP. More generous welfare state governments will spend more, and will
attract more immigrants. However, larger government expenditure implies higher tax
rates, and this may discourage migration. If all countries were equally efficient in their
spending, the sign of the effect should depend on whether immigrants are net contrib-
utors or receivers. In that case, South-North migration should be affected positively
by expenditure. However, larger expenditures in some countries may be due to lower
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efficiency, which might imply that everyone becomes a net contributor, making the
effect unambiguously negative. Results in Table 7 suggest that the effect is negative.
Column (4) includes a warfare measure for the origin country. This variable mea-
sures the share of months over the last decade that the country was involved in a war
of any type. Armed conflicts displace a lot of people who escape from the tragedy.
This fact is reflected in the estimates: a decade of war in an origin country increases
the stock of immigrants from that country in a 76 %. The political regime may also be
important for migration. People may be less willing to leave a good democracy (every-
thing else constant); moreover, in a dictatorship, they are usually not allowed to escape
from the country. Instead of weak central authorities (known as anocracies) may be
an encouraging environment for migration. In Column (5), I introduce the Polity IV
index, which ranges from −10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). Intermediate values
(with small absolute values) indicate the presence of an anocracy. For this reason, I
include a quadratic in the indicator. The quadratic term is negative and significantly
different from zero. The linear term is negative but small and clearly insignificant,
indicating that similarly fewer people migrate from autocracies than from democ-
racies compared to anocracies. In particular, the stock of migrants is around 30 %
lower if the origin country is a democracy or an autocracy relative to an anocracy.
Column (6) introduces the log of the population at the origin country. Countries with
larger young populations (relative to the total population) tend to send more migrants
abroad. Specifically, holding total population constant, an extra 1 % of population
of those ages increases migration by 4.6 %. Column (7) introduces all push and pull
factors together without any significant change.
The remaining two columns estimate respectively a regression that includes the
lagged bilateral stock as a control, and one that uses log flows as the dependent vari-
able. The fundamental problem to estimate these equations is that, given that the
grouping affects differently each census, observations need to be artificially grouped
further so that groups coincide over two consecutive censuses. This reduces observa-
tions substantially, and increases the incidence of grouping. Despite that, results in
Column (8) are very similar to the estimates presented above. Additionally, an extra
1 % in the stock of migrants in a country-pair in the preceding decade is associated
with a 0.4 % extra stock of immigrants in the given census. Column (9), which is esti-
mated only with 1,765 observations delivers results that are qualitatively (and, with
exceptions, quantitatively) similar to previous specifications, even though precision is
affected substantially.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I present a new database of bilateral migrant stocks, and I provide new
evidence on the determinants of bilateral migration. The database introduced in this
paper was collected from the National Statistical Offices from 24 OECD countries
based on population censuses. For each destination country and census date, it covers
188 countries of origin (sometimes in a grouped category) for the period 1960 to 2000.
The database fully covers the total stock of immigrants, keeping track of the residual
categories reported by Statistical Offices instead of making imputations to specific
countries of origin. I handle these grouped data in a raw manner in the estimation.
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Empirically, I test for the existence of non-linear effects of income gains on migra-
tion prospects depending on distance. The motivation for such heterogeneity can be
cost-based (individuals from closer countries can move back and forth as a conse-
quence of income fluctuations, whereas it is more costly for individuals from farther
away countries), or by means of a compensating wage differential (individuals dislike
living far away from home, and require a compensating wage differential to move,
that would increase with distance). Results suggest that this heterogeneity is indeed
very marked. For example, a 1000$ increase in US income per capita would increase
the stock of Mexican immigrants in the US by a 8 %, the stock of Irish immigrants
by a 5.2 %, and the stock of Chinese-born by only a 3.1 %. This result is very robust
across many different specifications.
Empirical findings in this paper suggest that income shocks have significant com-
positional effects, which are important for shaping immigration policy. For example,
if a policy maker is willing to preserve the ethnic mix (e.g. it was one of the goals
of the US immigration policy from 1920s to mid-1960s), countermeasures will be
required to compensate market forces. If country of origin is a good proxy for skills
of immigrants, this result would also have implications for the skill composition of
migrants. Additionally, destination countries should be more concerned about income
shocks in neighboring countries than what is suggested in the literature, and may want
to trade off development assistance and migration policies as a result.
A few remarks need to be made on the conclusions of this paper. The first
one is regarding the grouping of the data. There are 1,800 country pairs (out of
24 × 188 = 4512) for which I observe data in grouped categories for all years (which
only allows me to identify a fixed effect for each group). Also, for a similar reason,
there are 160 origin country × time dummies that cannot be individually identified
(out of 188 × 5 = 940). And data grouping also complicates the incorporation of the
role of networks in determining international migration, and the estimation of models
in flows (as shown in Table 7). A second remark is that the database does not include
information on educational attainment by immigrants. Such information would be
useful to test whether the compositional effects that I observe with respect to nation-
ality have important implications for skill composition of immigrants. To the best of
my knowledge, Docquier and Marfouk (2006), Docquier et al. (2009), and Brücker
et al. (2013) are the only databases in the literature that include such information,
but they only cover a shorter period. Third, the regressions estimated in this model
abstract from the role of trade. Part of migration flows can be equilibrium adjustments
to trade (as in di Giovanni et al. 2014). And fourth, the results in this paper can be
seen as an additional explanation to those covered in Clemens (2014) as to why the
elasticity of migration with respect to GDP per capita at origin is not homogeneous
across countries (he finds evidence of an inverse U-shape).
The paper also opens avenues for future research. It would be interesting to inves-
tigate how the heterogeneous effects found in this paper affect skill composition and
self-selection of migrants. Likewise, the database presented in this paper can be used
for a variety of cross-country migration analyses (e.g., to produce instrumental vari-
ables as in Llull 2011 or Ortega and Peri 2014a).
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Appendix 1: Robustness: linear effects
See Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8 Linear effects—introducing GDP per capita in logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log GDPpc dest. 0.607
(0.752)
1.389
(0.293)
0.581
(0.774)
0.628
(0.920)
0.831
(0.507)
Log GDPpc origin 0.074
(0.197)
−0.236
(0.089)
−0.169
(0.186)
0.160
(0.282)
0.020
(0.214)
Log GDPpc gap 0.190
(0.330)
Log distance −0.907
(0.074)
−0.903
(0.075)
−1.051
(0.047)
−0.931
(0.079)
−0.909
(0.056)
−0.837
(0.071)
Common language 0.588
(0.129)
0.585
(0.131)
0.771
(0.081)
0.591
(0.143)
0.581
(0.096)
0.612
(0.120)
Colonial rel. 2.284
(0.146)
2.281
(0.146)
2.117
(0.100)
2.285
(0.157)
2.269
(0.123)
2.375
(0.122)
Common border 0.025
(0.178)
0.033
(0.181)
0.044
(0.126)
−0.004
(0.188)
0.028
(0.151)
0.227
(0.165)
Log pop. origin 1.531
(0.487)
1.387
(0.502)
1.523
(0.158)
1.414
(0.235)
1.571
(0.635)
1.946
(0.430)
Log pop. dest. 0.834
(1.068)
0.880
(1.151)
−1.879
(0.426)
0.764
(1.059)
0.763
(1.243)
−0.551
(0.743)
Grouped obs. Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
St. devs. of controls No No No No No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Origin dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin-time dummies No No No Yes No No No
Destination dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Dest.-time dummies No No No No Yes No No
Country-pair dummies No No No No No Yes No
Obs 7340 7340 6727 7429 7340 7340 7332
R¯2 0.958 0.958 0.966 0.956 0.975 0.960 0.966
Standard errors, clustered at the origin-time level, in parentheses. Dependent variable: log migrant stocks.
Unit of observation: origin-destination-time. Regressions include the indicated fixed effects
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Table 9 Linear effects Özden et al. (2011) data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPpc dest. 0.015
(0.005)
0.009
(0.015)
0.014
(0.005)
0.011
(0.004)
GDPpc origin 0.002
(0.004)
−0.008
(0.006)
0.002
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
GDPpc gap −0.000
(0.003)
Log distance −1.138
(0.039)
−1.137
(0.039)
−1.047
(0.051)
−1.101
(0.038)
−1.135
(0.039)
Common language 0.905
(0.068)
0.904
(0.069)
0.903
(0.093)
0.831
(0.068)
0.924
(0.068)
Colonial rel. 1.945
(0.099)
1.945
(0.099)
1.999
(0.132)
1.833
(0.095)
1.968
(0.100)
Common border 0.375
(0.121)
0.375
(0.120)
0.046
(0.137)
0.543
(0.128)
0.354
(0.124)
Log pop. origin 0.938
(0.135)
0.901
(0.129)
1.669
(0.169)
0.938
(0.135)
0.938
(0.152)
Log pop. dest. 0.127
(0.278)
0.052
(0.278)
−0.245
(0.502)
0.254
(0.256)
−0.116
(0.147)
Grouped obs. Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Origin dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Origin-time dummies No No No Yes No No
Destination dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Dest.-time dummies No No No No Yes No
Country-pair dummies No No No No No Yes
Obs 20,232 20,232 6727 22,440 20,232 20,232
R¯2 0.906 0.906 0.953 0.899 0.914 0.949
Standard errors, clustered at the origin-time level, in parentheses. Dependent variable: log migrant stocks.
Unit of observation: origin-destination-time. Regressions include the indicated fixed effects
Appendix 2: Robustness: heterogeneous effects of income gains
See Tables 10 and 11.
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Table 10 Heterogeneous effects of income gains—GDP per capita in logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log GDPpc dest. 0.675
(0.755)
0.593
(0.752)
1.403
(0.299)
0.729
(0.777)
0.568
(0.918)
Log GDPpc dest. × log distance −0.216
(0.125)
−0.264
(0.128)
−0.159
(0.077)
−0.171
(0.155)
−0.337
(0.091)
0.142
(0.405)
Log GDPpc dest. × common lang. −0.264
(0.273)
−0.518
(0.163)
−0.471
(0.371)
−0.204
(0.272)
0.582
(0.534)
Log GDPpc dest. × colonial rel. −1.215
(0.466)
−0.396
(0.194)
−1.384
(0.517)
−0.274
(0.267)
−2.176
(1.213)
Log GDPpc dest. × common bord. −0.128
(0.450)
−0.122
(0.347)
0.149
(0.497)
0.116
(0.373)
−1.903
(1.785)
Log GDPpc origin 0.026
(0.197)
0.043
(0.198)
−0.344
(0.089)
−0.233
(0.140)
0.237
(0.338)
Log GDPpc origin × log distance 0.355
(0.057)
0.336
(0.061)
0.375
(0.035)
0.388
(0.061)
0.402
(0.033)
−0.443
(0.352)
Log GDPpc origin × common lang. 0.024
(0.088)
0.047
(0.058)
0.032
(0.089)
0.011
(0.060)
−0.303
(0.513)
Log GDPpc origin × colonial rel. −0.274
(0.088)
−0.366
(0.063)
−0.329
(0.095)
−0.251
(0.067)
0.290
(0.695)
Log GDPpc origin × common bord. −0.202
(0.270)
−0.223
(0.209)
−0.153
(0.275)
−0.276
(0.236)
0.677
(1.602)
Log distance −1.119
(0.087)
−1.098
(0.090)
−1.339
(0.060)
−1.201
(0.090)
−1.137
(0.058)
Common language 0.599
(0.125)
0.638
(0.148)
0.942
(0.099)
0.684
(0.196)
0.634
(0.140)
Colonial rel. 2.212
(0.143)
2.371
(0.169)
2.173
(0.108)
2.510
(0.203)
2.240
(0.139)
Common border 0.444
(0.172)
0.759
(0.380)
0.704
(0.294)
0.616
(0.390)
0.895
(0.324)
Log pop. origin 1.423
(0.486)
1.500
(0.486)
1.359
(0.173)
1.390
(0.227)
1.775
(0.676)
Log pop. dest. 0.800
(0.979)
0.788
(0.953)
−1.754
(0.456)
0.560
(0.913)
0.674
(1.039)
Grouped obs. Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Origin dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Origin-time dummies No No No Yes No No
Destination dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Dest.-time dummies No No No No Yes No
Country-pair dummies No No No No No Yes
Obs 7340 7340 6727 7340 7340 7340
R¯2 0.959 0.959 0.968 0.959 0.977 0.961
Standard errors, clustered at the origin-time level, in parentheses. Dependent variable: log migrant stocks.
Unit of observation: origin-destination-time. Regressions include the indicated fixed effects
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Table 11 Heterogeneous effects Özden et al. (2011) data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPpc dest. 0.017
(0.005)
0.007
(0.005)
−0.012
(0.015)
0.005
(0.005)
0.012
(0.004)
GDPpc dest. × log distance −0.000
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.003)
−0.019
(0.005)
−0.011
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
GDPpc dest. × common lang. −0.039
(0.006)
−0.051
(0.010)
−0.050
(0.007)
−0.026
(0.007)
0.017
(0.007)
GDPpc dest. × colonial rel. −0.054
(0.013)
−0.044
(0.017)
−0.055
(0.014)
−0.044
(0.014)
−0.037
(0.009)
GDPpc dest. × common border −0.003
(0.015)
0.010
(0.017)
−0.009
(0.016)
−0.001
(0.017)
−0.015
(0.013)
GDPpc origin −0.004
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.004)
−0.015
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.004)
−0.003
(0.004)
GDPpc origin × log distance 0.021
(0.004)
0.020
(0.003)
0.031
(0.004)
0.019
(0.004)
0.020
(0.003)
0.011
(0.003)
GDPpc origin × common lang. 0.002
(0.008)
−0.002
(0.009)
0.004
(0.008)
0.004
(0.008)
−0.016
(0.011)
GDPpc origin × colonial rel. −0.020
(0.005)
−0.034
(0.012)
−0.020
(0.005)
−0.024
(0.005)
0.005
(0.006)
GDPpc origin × common border −0.024
(0.018)
−0.008
(0.017)
−0.028
(0.018)
−0.024
(0.019)
−0.016
(0.014)
Log distance −1.185
(0.038)
−1.190
(0.039)
−1.165
(0.057)
−1.178
(0.039)
−1.184
(0.039)
Common language 0.918
(0.068)
0.962
(0.073)
1.124
(0.115)
0.977
(0.075)
0.961
(0.074)
Colonial rel. 1.925
(0.098)
1.889
(0.098)
1.973
(0.135)
1.873
(0.099)
1.926
(0.098)
Common border 0.574
(0.117)
0.739
(0.185)
0.353
(0.206)
0.769
(0.188)
0.721
(0.196)
Log pop. origin 0.785
(0.129)
0.817
(0.134)
1.549
(0.185)
0.824
(0.134)
0.793
(0.150)
Log pop. dest. −0.044
(0.280)
0.025
(0.282)
0.004
(0.514)
0.313
(0.287)
−0.436
(0.168)
Grouped obs. Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Origin dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Origin-time dummies No No No Yes No No
Destination dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Dest.-time dummies No No No No Yes No
Country-pair dummies No No No No No Yes
Obs 20,232 20,232 6,727 20,232 20,232 20,232
R¯2 0.907 0.907 0.955 0.908 0.915 0.949
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the origin-time level, in parentheses. Dependent variable: log migrant
stocks. Unit of observation: origin-destination-time. Regressions include the indicated fixed effects
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